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DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES FROM 
BELLIGERENT STATUS IN NON-INTERNATIONAL  
ARMED CONFLICTS  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Determining who qualifies as a lawful object of attack in the 
context of contemporary military operations against non-state 
belligerents1 is an increasingly demanding challenge.  While it is 
axiomatic that only persons who qualify as either enemy 
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author and not The Judge Advocate General’s Corps, the U.S. Army, or the 
Department of Defense. 
1 The term ‘belligerent’ is used throughout this article to designate a member 
of an armed group who performs the type of function historically performed by 
lawful combatants who are members of the regular armed forces of a State.  See 
generally Richard R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerillas, and 
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323 (1951) (describing the legal treatment of those 
who fall outside of the two traditional classes of persons entitled to protection 
under international law during times of war).  One of the challenges associated 
with selecting a term to designate such individuals is that the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) definition of ‘combatant’ is limited to the context of international 
armed conflicts.  See Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts art. 43, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (“Members of 
the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and 
chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to 
say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”).  As a result, various 
terms have been offered for this designation, including unlawful combatant, 
unprivileged belligerent, fighter, non-state actor, and non-state opponent.  All of 
these terms reflect a common underlying meaning: designation of an individual 
who, as the result of his relationship with enemy belligerent leadership and 
function as an enemy belligerent operative, should be treated for purposes of 
attack authority no differently than a combatant within the meaning of Protocol I. 
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belligerents or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities fall into 
this category, the nature of the non-state operatives has blurred the 
line between civilians protected from deliberate attack and 
belligerent operatives subject to attack.2  Indeed, many scholars of 
military strategy contend that this blurring is the result of 
deliberate tactics employed by non-state operatives in an effort to 
offset the military superiority of their nation state military 
opponents by adding tremendous complexity to the target 
decision-making process.3 
The target identification and selection process is never easy; 
uncertainty is an element of any armed conflict.  Threat 
identification has always been a core task of U.S. armed forces, a 
task intended to not only ensure the lawful use of combat power, 
but to also maximize the tactical and operational effects of that use 
while mitigating the risk to  civilians.4  However, when engaged in 
 
2 See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 188 (2010) (“A combatant remains a combatant when 
he/she is not actually fighting.”); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 33 (2nd ed. 2010) 
(“Combatants fall into two categories: (i) Members of the armed forces of a 
belligerent Party . . . .  (ii) Any non-members of the armed forces who take an 
active part in the hostilities . . . .”); see also Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 11–
12 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-
0990.pdf (discussing the increasing prevalence of civilian participation in 
hostilities and the confusion it creates). 
3 See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L 
AFF. 146, 148 (2008) (highlighting the use of modern media by insurgents to 
exploit civilian casualties in order to use the U.S. force’s adherence to law as a 
weapon against them); see also Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 
2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq, Executive Summary, RICIOK.COM, 
http://www.riciok.com/attack_summary.htm (last visted Nov. 19, 2011) 
(outlining the attack on the 507th Maintenance Company by an enemy using 
asymmetric tactics).  See generally MICHAEL L. GROSS, MORAL DILEMMAS OF MODERN 
WAR: TORTURE, ASSASSINATION, AND BLACKMAIL IN AN AGE OF ASYMMETRIC 
CONFLICT (2010) (evaluating modern changes to combatant relationships and 
identifying the moral issues inherent in asymmetric warfare); Eric Talbot Jensen, 
Combatant Status: It is Time for Intermediate Levels of Recognition for Partial 
Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 209 (2005) (reviewing the history of combatant status 
and arguing for a modification of the law of combatants to allow for some 
intermediate level of recognition in order to incentivize some type of self-
identification).  
4 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB 5-03.1: JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND 
EXECUTION SYSTEM VOLUME I (PLANNING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES) ch. 2, para. 8 
(1993), available at http://edocs.nps.edu/dodpubs/topic/jointpubs/JP5/JP5-
03.1_930804.pdf (discussing the use of threat identification and assessment in the 
larger context of the joint planning process); see also DEP’T. OF THE ARMY, FMI 3–
07.22, COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, para. 2–50 (2004) (calling for the 
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combat operations against non-state belligerents whose physical 
characteristics are almost always indistinguishable from the 
civilian population, the task of threat identification becomes 
exponentially more complex.  Furthermore, the consequence of 
error is exacerbated by the risk of alienating the civilian 
population, a consequence fundamentally inconsistent with the 
core tenet of counterinsurgency strategy—protection of that 
population.5 
The difficulty in distinguishing the protected (civilians) from 
the unprotected (belligerents and civilians taking a direct part in 
hostilities) does not, however, warrant a fundamentally different 
targeting paradigm in counterinsurgency operations, a non-
international armed conflict (NIAC), than in conventional 
international armed conflicts (IAC).6  The integrity of the target 
legality framework depends on the recognition of opposing 
belligerent groups in any armed conflict.  This recognition 
facilitates implementation of the principle of distinction by 
allowing belligerent forces to segregate those they encounter into 
two distinct groups:  those presumed hostile and therefore subject 
to immediate attack, and all others (civilians) presumed non-
hostile and therefore protected from immediate attack.7  As will be 
discussed in this Article, neither of these presumptions is absolute; 
both may be rebutted based on the nature of the interaction with 
 
coordination of ARSOF operations in order to avoid potential unwanted 
casualties). 
5 See COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, supra note 4, para. 2–10 (stating that 
protection of the civilian population is essential to a successful counterinsurgency 
operation).    
6 Compare Melzer, supra note 2, at 76  
In practice, civilian direct participation in hostilities is likely to entail 
significant confusion and uncertainty in the implementation of the 
principle of distinction.  In order to avoid the erroneous or arbitrary 
targeting of civilians entitled to protection against direct attack, it is 
therefore of particular importance that all feasible precautions be taken 
in determining whether a person is a civilian and, if so, whether he or 
she is directly participating in hostilities.  In case of doubt, the person in 
question must be presumed to be protected against direct attack.,  
with Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(2), (3) (“The civilian population as such, as 
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack . . . . unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”). 
7 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 48 (“In order to ensure respect for and 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict 
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants . . . 
.”). 
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friendly forces.  However, these presumptions add a modicum of 
clarity to an increasingly uncertain operational environment, 
clarity derived from the very nature of armed conflict and essential 
to protect both civilians and belligerents from the effects of 
overzealous or unjustifiably hesitant targeting authority. 
This may all seem obvious, but in reality there is an increasing 
tendency to treat all non-state actors as merely a conglomeration of 
civilians who take a direct part in hostilities.  This trend gained 
momentum following publication by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) of the Interpretative Guidance on the 
Meaning of Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH Study)—
although, ironically, the DPH Study rejects this position.8  Indeed, 
the derivative effect of considering all such non-state actors as 
civilians is that no one is genuinely protected by the distinction 
obligation. 
The trend appears to be the result of the combined effect of the 
lack of an explicit definition of a combatant that is applicable to 
NIAC, and the DPH Study’s endorsement of the concept of 
“continuous combat function” (CCF) as a means of establishing 
direct participation in hostilities (which results in a loss of civilian 
protection from attack).9  The effect of the CCF concept has made it 
more convenient to analyze the legality of attacking non-state 
actors through the DPH methodology than to assess whether such 
actors fall into a category of presumptively targetable belligerents 
subject to attack, no differently than their IAC counterparts. 
This Article will challenge that approach to targeting 
categorization in NIAC as flawed.  In so doing, it will argue that it 
is critical to acknowledge that NIAC—any NIAC—involves 
hostilities between opposing armed belligerent groups whose 
members are presumptive military objectives.  To support this 
argument, the Article begins by discussing the law of armed 
conflict’s (LOAC’s) categorization of civilians and belligerents 
(combatants in IAC), and how a lack of an explicit treaty definition 
of combatant in the NIAC context is an obstacle to acknowledging 
analogous categorization in NIAC. 
 
8 See generally Melzer, supra note 2 (analyzing the problems presented by the 
increasing number of participants in hostilities that do not adequately distinguish 
themselves from civilians, and the need for a finer level of distinction between 
civilian and combatant). 
9 See id. at 27–36 (discussing the distinction of civilians, armed forces, and 
organized armed groups under the LOAC, and the application of the CCF 
concept). 
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The Article then explores organizational membership and how 
subordination to command and control is the fundamental 
difference between belligerents and civilians in any armed conflict.  
It will explain the difference between status and conduct based 
targeting and why a focus on conduct to assess belligerent status is 
merely a permutation of traditional status recognition analysis. 
The Article then contrasts that approach by examining why the 
use of conduct undermines the extension of the DPH rule to define 
enemy belligerent forces.  These problems result in the DPH 
Study’s problematic and arguably schizophrenic imposition of a 
minimum force requirement even when targeting those engaged in 
CCF.  As the Article details, the utility of CCF is not in assessing 
which civilians are taking a direct part in hostilities, but in 
determining when an individual appearing to be a civilian is in fact 
a belligerent operative of an armed organized group.  
The Article will then address why treating all non-state 
opposition personnel as civilians taking a direct part in hostilities—
even when applying the CCH concept—provides these operatives 
with an unjustifiable windfall and conflates law and rules of 
engagement.  The Article concludes with a proposal of how to 
reconcile the DPH Study with status based targeting presumptions: 
maintain the distinction integrity.  Acknowledging that NIAC 
involves armed hostilities between competing belligerent groups is 
a critical first step, and the DPH Study makes an important 
contribution to this acknowledgment.  However, this must be 
accompanied by an additional acknowledgment:  all belligerent 
operatives—those involved in IAC and NIAC—are subject to 
status based targeting authority 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. LOAC Categorization of Civilians and Combatants 
Combatant.  For a layman, the meaning of this term probably 
seems obvious.  However, in the LOAC lexicon, nothing could be 
further from the truth.  While it might be tempting to invoke the 
ubiquitous ‘you know it when you see it’ U.S. Supreme Court 
definition of pornography for the term combatant, operational 
reality and legal definition appear severely attenuated where this 
term is concerned.10  The mere fact that a definition for combatant 
 
10 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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remained purely customary until finally defined in The 1977 
Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I) 
indicates the extent of legal uncertainty and complexity associated 
with the this term.11 
Ironically, it was not widespread discomfort with the 
uncertainty of the term combatant that motivated adoption of an 
express definition in AP I.12  Instead, it was the need to define 
“civilian”—a definition central to the protection established for 
civilians at the core of AP I’s targeting regime—that provided the 
motivation.  Because AP I adopted a negative definition of civilian 
(all individuals who are not combatants), it was necessary to 
provide an explicit definition of combatant.13  Although it took 
until 1977 for the development of a positive treaty definition of 
combatant, there existed, prior to this date, a general customary 
understanding of the term.  This customary understanding was 
based on two intertwined concepts:  privileged belligerent and 
prisoner of war.14  
In 1899, The Hague Convention II and Annexed Regulations—
the first comprehensive multi-lateral treaty regulating land 
warfare—defined individuals lawfully authorized to participate in 
hostilities.15  According to Article 1 of the Regulations: 
 
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I 
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of hard-
core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly 
doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in 
this case is not that. 
Id. 
11 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(2) (defining combatants as members of 
the armed forces of any party to a conflict). 
12 See id. art. 50 (declaring a civilian to be any person other than those defined 
in Article 43 of the Protocol and Article 4(A) of the Convention). 
13 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 610–12 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] (discussing, over 
several paragraphs, the defining characteristics of a “combatant”).   
14 See SOLIS, supra note 2, at 41–42 (discussing the history of the combatant’s 
privilege); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (defining the term “prisoner of war” and 
outlining categories into which prisoners of war fall, under this provision). 
15 See The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Law and Customs of 
War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land art. 1, July 29, 1899, 31 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/150?OpenDocument [hereinafter Hague (II) 
Regulations for War on Land] (providing for the issuing of instructions to armed 
land forces). 
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The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to 
armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the 
following conditions:  
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates;  
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance;  
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war. 
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the 
army, or form part of it, they are included under the 
denomination “army.”16 
It is clear from this provision that regular armed forces, or 
“armies,” were considered ipso facto lawfully authorized to engage 
in hostilities.  An identical version of this definition was included 
in the 1907 revision of the Regulations.17  This provision reflected 
the general understanding of the time that individuals authorized 
by their State to participate in armed hostilities – most obviously 
members of the regular armed forces but also militia and volunteer 
personnel properly connected to the command and control 
structure of the regular armed forces – were lawful belligerents.18  
Because the treaty recognized the lawful authority of these state 
forces to participate in hostilities, all individuals falling within this 
Hague definition were considered lawful belligerents:  belligerents 
because the duties of war required them to engage in hostilities; 
lawful because the treaty recognized their legal right to do so. 
The four part test for determining when associated militias 
qualified as lawful belligerents subsequently influenced the 
 
16 Id. § 1, ch. 1, art. 1 (outlining the rights and duties of armies, militia, and 
volunteer corps). 
17 The Hague Convention (IV) with Respect to the Law and Customs of War 
on Land, Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land art. 1, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 
[hereinafter Hague (IV) Regulations for War on Land] (adopting the same 
definition found in Hague (II) Regulations for War on Land, for “[t]he 
qualifications of Belligerents”). 
18 See id. (explaining that belligerents included armies, militia, and volunteer 
corps who were, among other requirements, “commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates”). 
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development of a treaty definition of prisoner of war (POW).19  
Although neither the 1899 nor 1907 Hague Regulations included an 
express POW definition, both these treaties implied that any 
individual satisfying the definition of belligerent who falls into 
enemy hands would be a POW.20  The linkage between the lawful 
belligerent definition and POW status became express in 1929, 
when the first treaty devoted to the protection of POWs came into 
force.  Article 1 of the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War included within the protection of 
the treaty all captured individuals who met the Hague Regulation 
definition of lawfully qualified belligerent.21  When updated in 
1949, the drafters incorporated the Hague lawful belligerent 
definition verbatim as the POW definition.  According to Article 4 
of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (GPW): 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, 
are persons belonging to one of the following categories, 
who have fallen into the power of the enemy: 
 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as 
well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part 
of such armed forces. 
 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other 
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance 
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and 
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this 
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or 
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance 
movements, fulfil the following conditions: 
 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for 
 
19 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
supra note 14, art. 4(A) (defining prisoners of war through the use of definitions 
almost identical to that used in Hague (II) Regulations for War on Land). 
20 See Hague (II) Regulations for War on Land, supra note 15, § 1, ch. 2 
(detailing the prescribed treatment of prisoners of war, in the chapter directly 
following the definition of “belligerents”); Hague (IV) Regulations for War on 
Land, supra note 17, § 1, ch. 2 (same). 
21 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 
1, 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343. 
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his subordinates; 
 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance; 
 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with 
the laws and customs of war.22 
This undisputed interrelationship between the Hague 
definition of lawful belligerent and the GPW definition of POW led 
to reliance on Article 4 of the GPW as the controlling definition of 
lawful belligerent, or combatant.  Nonetheless, it was clear that 
nothing in Article 4 of the GPW purported to define the term 
combatant.23  Instead, Article 4 simply relied on the antecedent 
Hague definition of lawful belligerent as the core for its POW 
definition.  However, in the absence of an express definition of 
combatant, it became common practice to equate the GPW 
definition of POW with that of combatant —a practice difficult to 
question considering the origins of the POW definition.24  What 
remained uncertain, however, was whether the implied combatant 
definition of Article 4 of the GPW (and by implication, Article 1 of 
the Hague Regulations) was exclusive, or whether it only defined 
combatants legally authorized to engage in hostilities.  In other 
words, what is the proper characterization of a “fighter” without 
legal privilege?  Can this fighter be considered a de facto combatant 
without privilege?  Or by exclusion, is this individual a civilian 
engaging in conduct inconsistent with his presumptive inoffensive 
status?25 
 
22 Id. art. 4.  
23 See id. 
24 See THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (III) OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 45–48 
(Jean Pictet ed. 1952) (describing how the 1899 and 1907 Conferences’ lengthiest 
and most important discussions focused on the definition of “belligerent status”); 
see generally Geoffrey S. Corn, Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilian Augmentees, 
the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for Permissible 
Civilian Battlefield Functions, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 257 (2008) (detailing the 
history of and qualifying characteristics that compose prisoner of war status, as 
outlined in part by the Geneva Conventions).  
25 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 558 
(citation omitted). 
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The lack of an express combatant definition in the various 
treaties developed to regulate armed conflict, made it impossible to 
answer this question with certitude.  Additional clarity emerged in 
1977.  In that year, AP I provided the first express treaty definition 
of combatant.26  As indicated by the ICRC Commentary to the 
 
In armed conflict with an international character, a person of enemy 
nationality who is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status is, in principle, a 
civilian protected by the fourth Convention, so that there are no gaps in 
protection.  However, things are not always so straightforward in the 
context of the armed conflicts of Article 1 (General principles and scope 
of application), paragraph 4, as the adversaries can have the same 
nationality. (52) Moreover, the concept of alien occupation often becomes 
rather fluid in guerrilla operations as no fixed legal border delineates the 
areas held by either Party, and this may result in insurmountable 
technical difficulties with regard to the application of some of the 
provisions of the Fourth Convention. 
Id.   
26 Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 were developed to supplement and 
bring up to date the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.  Although the United 
States played a significant role in the drafting of these treaties, Additional 
Protocol I was withdrawn from Senate consideration by President Reagan.  See 
Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan, Protocol II Additional to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of Non 
International Armed Conflicts, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at III 
(1987) (stating the U.S. government’s reasoning as to why Protocol I would not be 
submitted for senatorial advice and consent).  This was in large measure because 
of the conclusion that several provisions of Additional Protocol I extended LOAC 
protections to terrorists; and that the scope provision of Additional Protocol II 
was too restrictive.  Id. 
 Nonetheless, prior to U.S. military response to the attacks of September 11, 
2001, characterizing the bulk of Additional Protocol I as a reflection of customary 
international law binding on the United States would have been relatively 
uncontroversial among legal experts responsible for advising U.S. military 
planners and commanders.  The post-September 11, 2001 legal determinations 
made by President Bush regarding the applicability of law of war provisions to 
the conflict with al Qaeda, however, radically altered this practice.  A much more 
textual approach prevailed when interpreting law of war treaty obligations.  See 
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. 
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t. of Def., regarding Application of Treaties 
and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (22 Jan. 2002), available at 
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf 
(responding to the issue of whether certain treaties included in the laws of armed 
conflict apply to trial procedures and detention conditions for members of al 
Qaida and the Taliban).  
 This revised approach to interpreting the status of provisions of Additional 
Protocol I is reflected by comparing treatment of this treaty in the law of war 
chapter of the Operational Law Handbook, which is perhaps the most widely-relied 
upon reference for military legal practitioners supporting ongoing operations.  
The current version of the Handbook provides the following: 
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treaty, the GPW left the definition of this critical term to inference:  
“[i]n the Third Convention, which deals only with the protection of 
prisoners of war, and not with the conduct of hostilities, this 
combatant status is not explicitly affirmed, but it is implicitly 
included in the recognition of prisoner-of-war status in the event of 
capture.”27 
 
1977 Geneva Protocols (ref. (7)).  Although the U.S. has not ratified 
[Additional Protocol] I and II, 155 nations have ratified [Additional 
Protocol] I.  U.S. Commanders must be aware that many allied forces are 
under a legal obligation to comply with the Protocols . . . .  This 
difference in obligation has not proved to be a hindrance to U.S./allied 
or coalition operations since promulgation of AP I in 1977. 
INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & 
SCHOOL, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 15 (2006). 
 Although this excerpt does not explicitly indicate a rejection of prior 
interpretations of obligation vis-à-vis Additional Protocol I, it clearly does not 
explicitly assert such an obligation.  The full significance of this excerpt is only 
apparent when compared to the description of Additional Protocol I in prior 
editions of the Operational Law Handbook.  For example, the 2003 edition states the 
following: 
1977 Geneva Protocols (ref. (7)). Although the U.S. has not ratified 
[Geneva Protocol] I and II, judge advocates must be aware that 
approximately 150 nations have ratified the Protocols (thus most of the 
185 member states of the [United Nations]).  The Protocols will come into 
play in most international operations.  U.S. Commanders must be aware 
that many allied forces are under a legal obligation to comply with the 
Protocols.  Furthermore, the U.S. considers many of the provisions of the 
Protocols to be applicable as customary international law. 
INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & 
SCHOOL, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 (2003) (emphasis added).  
Comparison of these two versions of the Operational Law Handbook indicates a 
general “rollback” by the executive branch of the treatment of Additional Protocol 
I provisions.  Numerous experts and government legal advisers have argued for 
years that many of these provisions reflect binding norms of customary 
international law.  See, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the 
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L & POL’Y 419 (1987) (demonstrating that the 
1977 Protocols have a solid basis in customary international law); see also, e.g., 
Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, LCDR Michael F. Lohr, Dennis Yoder, and 
William Anderson, to John H. McNeill, Assistant Gen. Counsel (Int'l), Office of the 
Sec'y of Def., 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary 
International Law Implications (8 May 1986).  Unfortunately, opponents of this 
proposition have relied on the repudiation of Additional Protocol I by President 
Reagan.  These opponents assert this repudiation is particularly relevant vis-à-vis 
the armed conflict with al Qaeda because it was motivated in large part by the 
United States’ concern that Additional Protocol I unjustifiably extended law of 
war protections to terrorist operatives. 
27 COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 515.  
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In order to provide a more certain definition of combatant, 
Article 43(2) of AP I provides that “[m]embers of the armed forces 
of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains 
covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, 
that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities.”28  Simple and direct, this definition reveals its roots in 
both the Hague Regulations and the GPW.  Combatants include all 
members of the armed forces with the exception of medical 
personnel and chaplains—individuals technically considered non-
combatant members of the armed forces because of their limited 
function of caring for and ministering to the wounded and sick.  As 
combatants these individuals are legally authorized to participate 
in hostilities.  Who falls into the category of armed forces?  Article 
43(1) answers this question by defining armed forces: 
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all 
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under 
a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its 
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a 
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse 
Party.  Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal 
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict.29 
Accordingly, armed forces include the organized armed units 
of a party to an armed conflict, and all such individuals are 
combatants vested with the legal authority to engage in armed 
hostilities.  Perhaps of equal importance is that this definition was 
considered exclusive, meaning that only members of the armed 
forces (as defined by Article 43(1)) qualify as combatants within the 
meaning of international law.  This conclusion is emphasized by 
the Commentary discussion of Article 43: 
All members of the armed forces are combatants, and only 
members of the armed forces are combatants.  This should 
therefore dispense with the concept of “quasi-combatants”, 
which has sometimes been used on the basis of activities 
related more or less directly with the war effort.  Similarly, 
any concept of a part-time status, a semi-civilian, semi-
 
28 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(2). 
29 Id. art. 43(1). 
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military status, a soldier by night and peaceful citizen by 
day, also disappears.  A civilian who is incorporated in an 
armed organization such as that mentioned in paragraph 1, 
becomes a member of the military and a combatant 
throughout the duration of the hostilities . . . .30 
As noted above, the explicit definition of combatant and civilian as 
the exclusive legal categorization of individuals in armed conflict 
was directly linked to AP I’s codification of the principle of 
distinction; requiring combatants to constantly distinguish 
between those individuals qualifying as lawful objects of deliberate 
attack, and civilians protected from being made the deliberate 
object of attack, necessitated this express definition.31  The 
definition of combatant therefore established two competing 
targeting presumptions: combatants are presumed to be lawful 
objects of attack, whereas all other individuals (civilians by 
exclusion) are protected by a rebuttable presumption of 
inoffensiveness with an accordant immunity from deliberate 
attack.  
A combatant—an individual who according to AP I is granted 
the legal privilege to participate in hostilities—must therefore be a 
member of the armed forces or a member of a paramilitary 
organization associated with the armed forces operating under 
traditional command and subject to the military unit’s disciplinary 
structure.32  It is clear that civilians (even when authorized by a 
state to be present in the conflict area and therefore entitled to 
POW status upon capture) are not combatants pursuant to AP I 
because they are not fully integrated into a military command, 
control, and disciplinary structure.33  While Article 43 therefore 
added clarity to the categorization of individuals associated with 
armed conflict, two aspects of the definition call into question the 
extent of its impact on the broader question of targeting status 
 
30 COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 515 
(emphasis added). 
31 See id. at 514, 599–600 (providing distinct definitions for civilian and 
combatant, but noting that such sharp classifications cannot be performed easily). 
32 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(2) (“Members of the armed forces of a 
Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 
33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to 
participate directly in hostilities.”). 
33 E.g., COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 515 
(“All members of the armed forces are combatants, and only members of the 
armed forces are combatants.”) (emphasis added). 
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outside the context of inter-state hostilities.  First and most 
obviously, because the definition is embedded in AP I, it is limited 
to situations of international (inter-state34) armed conflicts.  
Additional Protocol II (AP II), AP I’s sister treaty supplementing 
the law applicable to NIAC, included no analogous definition.35  
Second, the definition of combatant included only individuals 
fighting on behalf of a state authority.  Article 43 simply did not 
address individuals fighting on behalf of non-state entities.36 
The inapplicability of Article 43’s combatant definition to 
NIAC has contributed to what the authors assert is a false 
conclusion that “combatant” is an alien concept outside the context 
of IAC.  Instead of focusing on the lack of an analogous definition 
in AP II, the more appropriate focus in assessing targeting status in 
NIAC is the relationship between the principle of distinction and 
 
34 “Additional Protocol I contains significant advances in LOAC.  The core 
LOAC concepts of distinction, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality, 
formerly found only in customary law, are codified and described in Additional 
Protocol I, if only in broad terms.”  SOLIS, supra note 2, at 122.  However, some of 
the provisions of AP I pushed the boundaries of LOAC too far and rendered it 
objectionable to the United States (as well as many other nations) leading the 
United States not to ratify it.  For example, Article 1(3) makes the treaty applicable 
to international armed conflicts.  Protocol I, supra note 1, art 1(3).  Then, Article 
1(4) “goes onto expand the definition of what constitutes an international armed 
conflict” making the treaty applicable to CARs – conflicts purporting to resist 
colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime.  SOLIS, supra note 2, at 
123.  The United States was unable to accept this definition arguing that it “blurs 
national and international conflicts, making the applicability of [LOAC], turn on 
the asserted motive of a rebel force.”  Id. at 124.  The United States has not ratified 
AP I; the AP I version on an international armed conflict is not accepted as 
customary international law.  See Protocol I, supra note 1, art 1(3)–(4) (noting that 
the protections of international customary law are available to persons whose 
cases are not covered by the Protocol). 
35 See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610 [hereinafter Protocol II] 
(containing no definition of the term “combatant”). 
36 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(1).  
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that 
Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented 
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party.  
Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system 
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict. 
Id. 
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the division between civilians and de facto combatants.37  As noted 
above, Article 43 was included in AP I as the essential predicate to 
implementing this principle.  Accordingly, the underlying premise 
of Article 43 is that in order to facilitate the distinction process, it is 
essential to establish a clear dichotomy between combatant 
(privileged or unprivileged) and civilian.  Without this dichotomy, 
the efficacy of this critical principle will inevitably be diluted.  In 
essence, if everyone is a civilian, then no one is genuinely protected 
by the distinction obligation, for government forces will inevitably 
blur the line between “enemy” and “civilian.” 
The fact that Article 43’s definition of combatant is tethered to 
the Hague definition of “qualified belligerent” likely explains why 
a similar article was not included in AP II.  By linking the 
definition of combatant with legal qualification to participate in 
hostilities, the definition became incompatible with the law of 
NIAC, where by definition only the government forces may 
lawfully use force.  From the inception of Common Article 3, the 
first LOAC provision developed specifically to regulate NIAC, 
states adamantly opposed even the suggestion that non-state 
belligerents were vested with legal privilege to engage in hostilities 
against state forces.38  Although the ICRC pressed for such a 
 
37 Although AP II does not contain an analogous definition of combatant as 
that in AP I, it does require that civilians be “[protected] against the dangers 
arising from military operations.”  See Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13. 
38 See 1 COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 43–44 (Jean 
Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter WOUNDED AND SICK COMMENTARY]:   
From the very outset, in the course of the first discussions of a general 
character, divergences of view became apparent.  A considerable number 
of delegations were opposed, if not to any and every provision in regard 
to civil war, at any rate to the unqualified application of the Convention 
to such conflicts.  The principal criticisms of the Stockholm draft may be 
summed up as follows.  It was said that it would cover in advance all 
forms of insurrection, rebellion, anarchy, and the break-up of States, and 
even plain brigandage.  Attempts to protect individuals might well prove 
to be at the expense of the equally legitimate protection of the State.  To 
compel the Government of a State in the throes of internal convulsions to 
apply to these internal disturbances the whole body of provisions of a 
Convention expressly concluded to cover the case of war would mean 
giving its enemies, who might be no more than a handful of rebels or 
common brigands, the status of belligerents, and possibly even a certain 
degree of legal recognition.  There was also a risk of common or ordinary 
criminals being encouraged to give themselves a semblance of 
organization as a pretext for claiming the benefit of the Conventions, 
representing their crimes as ‘acts of war’ in order to escape punishment 
for them.  A party of rebels, however small, would be entitled under the 
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development, because it would prohibit states from punishing 
their own citizens for taking up arms against lawful authority, the 
proposal was dead on arrival.39  State opposition to granting 
dissident and insurgent belligerent forces legal privilege to engage 
in hostilities has been a constant feature of the LOAC even during 
an era of amalgamation of IAC and NIAC.  Indeed, the 
inapplicability of legal privilege for non-state operatives in NIAC 
is today the most significant genuine difference between the law of 
IAC and NIAC.40  Accordingly, applying Article 43’s definition of 
combatant to NIAC was and remains incompatible with this 
fundamental difference in the nature of these two categories of 
armed conflict. 
Nonetheless, what is most significant about AP I’s definition of 
combatant is the segregation of individuals into two distinct 
categories for purposes of facilitating implementation of the 
principle of distinction.  This segregation effectively sets the 
conditions for belligerents (members of opposing armed organized 
groups) to distinguish between lawful objects of attack and 
individuals protected from attack.41  In the context of IAC, two 
considerations made it totally logical to link the definition of 
 
Conventions to ask for the assistance and intervention of a Protecting 
Power. 
39 See, e.g., id. (explaining how the differences in opinion led to criticism of 
the Stockholm draft). 
40 See Grand Jury Indictment at 11–12, United States v. Walker Lindh  (E. 
Dist. Va. Feb. 5, 2002) (No. 02-37a) available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uswlindh020502cmp.html 
(indicting a non-state actor for conspiracy to kill Americans based on his 
involvement with al-Qaeda); Memorandum from President George Bush to the 
Vice President et al. on the Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda (Feb. 7, 
2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127 
/02.02.07.pdf (expressing his view that the Geneva Convention does not apply to 
the United States’ conflict with al-Qaeda because al-Qaeda is not a state actor);  
MINISTRY  OF DEFENSE, JPS 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT ¶ 15.6.2, at 389 (2004) (U.K.) (“Unlike combatants in an international 
armed conflict, members of dissident armed forces remain liable to prosecution 
for offences under domestic law.”); Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Indefinite 
Detention Under the Laws of War, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 54 (2011) 
(“[I]ncreasingly prevalent in today's conflicts involving non-state actors and 
asymmetric warfare, are law of war provisions which govern detention of those 
who directly participate in hostilities, perform a continuous combat function for 
an organized armed group, or otherwise pose a security risk or threat.”). 
41 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43 (limiting the types of participants who 
have a “right to participate directly in hostilities”). 
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combatant to the regular armed forces and militias properly 
integrated with those forces.  First, armed forces had customarily 
been considered combatants.  Second, IAC by its very nature 
almost always involves hostilities between two or more nation- 
state militaries.42  Neither of these considerations extend to NIAC, 
especially the classic internal armed conflict.43  Internal conflicts 
had customarily involved hostilities between government armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized belligerent 
groups (or even between competing organized non-state 
belligerent groups).  Designating all of these belligerents as 
combatants ran afoul of the assumption that state armed forces 
acted pursuant to lawful authority, whereas dissident forces acted 
without such authority.44  Furthermore, NIAC by its nature did not 
involve hostilities between the regular armed forces of two states, 
but between regular state armed forces and non-state belligerent 
groups.45 
Nonetheless, the recognition of opposition belligerent groups is 
an essential aspect of all conflict regulation.  Nothing about the 
nature of NIAC undermines the importance of this recognition in 
relation to implementing the principle of distinction.  Indeed, while 
there is no analogous combatant definition in AP II, that treaty 
 
42 However, hostilities are not always necessary; the law applicable to IAC 
also applies to uncontested occupations.  An occupation is simply “taking firm 
possession of enemy territory for the purpose of holding it.”  See DEP’T OF THE 
ARMY, FM27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, ¶ 351–52(a) (1956), available at 
http://www.aschq.army.mil/gc/files/fm27-10.pdf (defining the term 
“occupation” and outlining the effectiveness, maintenance, and termination of an 
occupation).  Occupations, whether contested or not, are governed by the Geneva 
Convention for the protection of civilians.  E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 3518 (“The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance.”). 
43 But see Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: 
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
295, 309 (2007) (arguing that the either/or approach to determining whether a 
conflict is international or non-international fails to consider the possibility of a 
hybrid category of armed conflict: extraterritorial non-international armed 
conflict). 
44 See WOUNDED AND SICK COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 43–44 (“Insurgents . 
. . are not all brigands.”). 
45 E.g., id. (stating that the reason states did not want to extend the scope of 
Common Article 2 was so as not to extend legitimacy to internal dissident 
groups). 
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does impose an explicit distinction obligation to “parties” to a 
NIAC.  According to Article 13: 
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall 
enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from 
military operations.  To give effect to this protection, the 
following rules shall be observed in all circumstances. 
 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack.  Acts or threats of 
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population are prohibited.46 
This prohibition against making civilians the object of attack in 
the context of NIAC necessarily implies that there must be other 
individuals falling outside this protection who are subject to a 
presumption of targetability.  How are such individuals 
characterized?  If they fall within a presumptive lawful attack 
authority, they cannot properly be considered civilians, because 
civilians benefit from the inverse presumption protecting them 
from deliberate attack.  Are they combatants?  The absence of a 
combatant definition in AP II might suggest a negative answer to 
this question.  Certainly, it is difficult to sustain an argument that 
they are combatants within the meaning of the AP I combatant 
definition—an individual legally privileged to participate in 
hostilities.  However, the obvious division between lawful and 
unlawful objects of attack reflected in Article 13 indicates that 
organized non-state belligerent operatives are, in effect, 
combatants without privilege, individuals subject to presumptive 
lawful attack authority by virtue of their status, yet lacking any 
international legal authority to participate in hostilities against the 
state.47 
The Commentary to Article 13 corroborates the conclusion that 
Article 13 does indeed reflect the assumption that civilians are 
distinct from the organized armed groups engaged in NIAC.48  
 
46 Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(1)–(2). 
47 See id. art. 13(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”). 
48 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 1447–53 
(analyzing the implicit meaning of Article 13 and providing definitions of 
civilians, how military groups should interact with known civilian populations, 
and defining the term “attack” for its use in the Article’s prohibition against 
attacking civilians).  
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These groups are normally not characterized as combatants (for the 
reasons explained above), but instead as “parties to the conflict.”  
For example, in emphasizing the obligation that belligerent parties 
in NIAC take measures to ensure compliance with Article 13, the 
Commentary notes: 
Each party should, in good faith, design such measures and 
adapt them to the specific circumstances, bearing in mind 
the means available to it, and based on the general 
principles relating to the protection of the civilian 
population which apply irrespective of whether the conflict is an 
international or an internal one.49 
The Commentary also acknowledges that distinguishing between 
true civilians and members of armed non-state groups may often 
be difficult in the NIAC context, but that this does not alter the 
fundamental protection of the civilian.  Interestingly, the term 
combatant slips into the Commentary discussion: 
It cannot be denied that in situations of non-international 
armed conflict in particular, the civilian population 
sometimes shelters certain combatants, and it may be 
difficult to ascertain the status of individuals making up the 
population.  However, we must point out that if the mere 
presence of some individuals not protected under 
paragraph 3 of this article were to permit an attack against 
a whole group of civilians, the protection enjoyed by the 
civilian population would become totally illusory.50 
These references to the commentary all point to the same 
conclusion:  although the treaty law of NIAC does not include an 
express combatant definition, NIAC involves hostilities between 
state armed forces and non-state de facto combatants. 
The alternative inference derived from the absence of a 
definition of combatant in treaties regulating NIAC is that the 
concept is exclusive to IAC.  Accordingly, NIAC involves 
hostilities between state armed forces and civilians directly 
participating in hostilities.  This interpretation is fatally flawed.  As 
will be explained in greater detail below, it distorts the 
fundamental lines of authority and obligation historically 
associated with armed conflict.  By treating members of armed 
 
49 Id. at 1449 (emphasis added). 
50 Id. at 1452 (emphasis added). 
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belligerent groups as civilians directly participating in hostilities—
even when applying an expansive definition of direct participation 
endorsed by the DPH Study—the authority of government forces 
to engage and subdue these individuals is diluted.  Furthermore, 
refusal to segregate the population into de facto combatant and 
civilian populations compromises the principle of distinction. 
These inevitable consequences of failing to acknowledge non-
state belligerents in the context of NIAC motivated the ICRC to 
conclude that the legal authority to attack members of non-state 
belligerent groups in NIAC is identical to the authority to engage 
combatants in IAC.51  While not using the term combatant to 
characterize members of such groups, it is clear that the ICRC 
understands that the authority to target non-state belligerent 
operatives is not based exclusively on a DPH test.  Instead, the 
DPH rule operates as a limitation on the protection afforded to 
civilians in NIAC no differently than it does in IAC.  However, this 
rule is inapposite to members of armed belligerent groups, for such 
individuals are not properly considered true civilians, but instead 
‘belligerents’ subject to lawful attack by virtue of their connection 
and role within the group.  Accordingly, unlike civilians who take 
a direct part in hostilities, the legality of attacking such individuals 
is derived from their membership status and not their individual 
conduct assessed on a case-by-case basis.  This conclusion is 
reflected in the DPH Study.  According to Part II: 
While it is generally recognized that members of State 
armed forces in non-international armed conflict do not 
qualify as civilians, treaty law, State practice, and 
international jurisprudence have not unequivocally settled 
whether the same applies to members of organized armed 
groups (i.e. the armed forces of non-State parties to an 
armed conflict).  Because organized armed groups 
generally cannot qualify as regular armed forces under 
national law, it might be tempting to conclude that 
membership in such groups is simply a continuous form of 
civilian direct participation in hostilities.  Accordingly, 
members of organized armed groups would be regarded as 
civilians who, owing to their continuous direct 
 
51 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 36 (concluding that civilians cease to be 
identified as such when they engage in continuous combat as members of 
organized armed groups). 
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participation in hostilities, lose protection against direct 
attack for the entire duration of their membership.  
However, this approach would seriously undermine the 
conceptual integrity of the categories of persons underlying the 
principle of distinction, most notably because it would create 
parties to non-international armed conflicts whose entire armed 
forces remain part of the civilian population.  As the wording 
and logic of Article 3 GC I-IV and Additional Protocol II 
(AP II) reveals, civilians, armed forces, and organized 
armed groups of the parties to the conflict are mutually 
exclusive categories also in non-international armed 
conflict.52  
If the ICRC is correct (consistent with the thesis of this Article), 
what then distinguishes civilians from non-state belligerent 
operatives53 in the context of NIAC?  As noted above, the answer 
cannot be found in any positive treaty provision applicable to 
NIAC.  Instead, the answer is revealed by considering the 
fundamental difference between belligerents and civilians in any 
armed conflict:  subordination to belligerent command and control. 
2.2. Role of Organizational Membership and Subordination to 
Command and Control 
Armed conflict involves the contest between belligerent 
opponents organized into military units acting to achieve tactical, 
operational, and strategic objectives.  The very purpose of the 
organized nature of belligerent groups is to ensure that individuals 
act to achieve these collective military goals.  The inherent 
obligation of members of such groups to obey the orders of 
military and civilian superiors is consistent with this purpose.  
Command structure, rank, and the duty of obedience all reflect a 
simple axiom of belligerent groups:  members of these groups act 
 
52 Id. at 27–28 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
53 The Authors use the term “belligerent” in lieu of “combatant” for the 
purpose of distinguishing non-state belligerent operatives (who lack any legal 
privilege to participate in hostilities) with state belligerent operatives who are 
designated “combatants” in accordance with Article 43 of AP I.  However, this is 
not intended to suggest any fundamental difference in the authority to subject 
individuals of either designation to deliberate attack. 
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as agents of the group leadership to achieve military goals, not as 
individuals.54 
From the inception of treaty-based recognition of belligerents 
in the 1899 Hague Regulations, emphasis on this subordination to 
command authority has defined the concept of belligerent.55  As 
noted above, this was originally reflected in the requirement that 
individuals operate on behalf of the state—the only entity 
authorized within the Westphalian system to authorize lawful 
belligerent conduct.56  However, it is also clear that this was not in 
and of itself sufficient to qualify as a belligerent.  In addition, 
belligerents were those individuals integrated into the command 
and control structure of a military unit for the purpose of engaging 
in armed hostilities.  These latter elements of belligerent status are 
reflected in the requirement that the individual carry arms openly 
and conduct operations in accordance with the laws of war—both 
of which imply exercising a belligerent function.57  Accordingly, 
 
54  See, e.g., CTR. FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY LEADERSHIP: 
COMPETENT, CONFIDENT, AND AGILE (2006), available at  http://usacac.army.mil 
/cac2/Repository/Materials/fm6-22.pdf (noting that the U.S. Army’s oath 
requires that “[s]oldiers simultaneously acknowledge the authority of the 
President as Commander in Chief and officers as his agents” and that “[t]he 
purpose of the oath is to affirm military subordination to civilian authority”); see 
also Yamashita v. Styer, 66 S. Ct. 340, 353–58 (1946) (J. Murphy dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority’s reasoning for charging the Japanese General with war 
atrocities committed by troops under his command but which he did not order 
was without precedent in international law and a violation of due process); Corn, 
supra note 24, at 259–61 (proposing the functional discretion test as “an alternate 
approach for determining the legal limits of using civilian personnel” in 
battlefield support functions). 
55 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 45–48 
(overviewing early dialogue concerning defining a “belligerent” and noting that 
1907 Hague regulations ultimately employed “that of being commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates” as one of the required elements for obtaining 
belligerent status). 
56 The Westphalian system refers to the balance-of-power system that arose 
out of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia in which the power of a state was determined 
by the number of other states with “substantially equal strength.”  HENRY 
KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 21 (1994).  See also WOUNDED AND SICK COMMENTARY, supra 
note 38, at 43–44 (noting states’ objections to providing legal recognition to rebel 
groups and objecting to allowing such groups protection under Article 3 when 
engaging in acts of aggression); GIULIANA ZICCARDI CAPALDO, THE PILLARS OF 
GLOBAL LAW tbl. 1 (2008) (characterizing states’ sovereignty within the 
Westphalian system as containing “[i]ndependence and supreme authority . . . 
within their territory”). 
57 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (describing prisoners of war as, inter alia, either 
members of the armed forces, members of the militia, or persons who accompany 
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subordination to the authority of belligerent group leadership for 
the purpose of engaging in hostilities at the direction of that 
leadership is the true sine qua non of belligerent status.  As the 
DPH Study notes: 
Organized armed groups belonging to a non-State party to 
an armed conflict include both dissident armed forces and 
other organized armed groups.  Dissident armed forces 
essentially constitute part of a State’s armed forces that 
have turned against the government.  Other organized 
armed groups recruit their members primarily from the 
civilian population but develop a sufficient degree of 
military organization to conduct hostilities on behalf of a 
party to the conflict, albeit not always with the same means, 
intensity and level of sophistication as State armed forces.58 
This language indicates another acknowledgment that NIAC 
involves hostilities between armed belligerent groups—in the 
terminology of Common Article 3, “Parties” to an armed conflict.59  
If this is true (as the author believes it is), then it seems logical that 
the key factor in determining belligerent status—particularly for 
non-state operatives—cannot be the state subordination element.  
Instead, the key factor is membership in the belligerent 
organization exercising a function historically associated with 
belligerent operatives, namely participating in hostilities.  This is 
precisely the equation proposed by the DPH Study to distinguish 
between a genuine civilian and a member of a non-state belligerent 
group: 
Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for 
individual membership in an organized armed group is 
whether a person assumes a continuous function for the 
group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities 
(hereafter: “continuous combat function”).60 
 
members of the armed forces or the militia, and thus suggesting that a prisoner of 
war is someone who likely exercised a belligerent function).  
58 Melzer, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
59 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, at 27 (“In the case of armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to 
the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions.”). 
60 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 33. 
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With the exception of dissident armed forces (whose “status” as 
belligerents is revealed by their membership in an armed force 
formerly loyal to government authority), determining NIAC 
belligerent status is unquestionably complex.  Lacking the prospect 
of combatant immunity, there is little incentive for non-state 
operatives to wear uniforms or other insignia that distinguish them 
from the civilian population.61  As a result, it is often difficult to 
determine the difference between civilians and non-state 
belligerent operatives based on outward appearance.  Instead, the 
difference will almost inevitably turn on the nature of the 
individuals’ conduct.  When that conduct indicates the individual 
is acting as an agent of the belligerent group leadership for the 
purpose of engaging in hostile functions, it in effect establishes 
belligerent status. 
Herein is the ultimate complexity of acknowledging belligerent 
status in NIAC:  while it is this status that subjects the operative to 
the scope of targeting authority identical to that applicable to a 
combatant in IAC, determining that status inevitably requires 
assessment of individual conduct.62  Focusing on relevant 
indicators to determine belligerent status is nothing new.  This has 
always been an aspect of the execution of military operations 
during armed conflict, what military operators would call threat 
recognition.63  What complicates this process in the NIAC context 
 
61 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer 
Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 262–63 
(2011) (noting that the United States deemed Taliban fighters unlawful enemy 
combatants not because “they were not fighting on behalf of a state,” but rather 
because “they failed to meet the ‘right of person’ component . . . [by failing] to 
wear a distinctive uniform”). 
62 Compare Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43  
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups, and units which are under a command responsible to that 
Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented 
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse party.,  
with Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(3) (providing no definition of combatant, but 
mandating that civilians be protected from attack unless they take a direct part in 
hostilities, thereby requiring a conduct-biased analysis in the context of a NIAC). 
63 See Appendix B, A Soldier’s Task: Use Force Appropriately, 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report 
/call/call_96-6_roeappb1.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) 
(describing the procedures Army personnel should follow in 
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is the reality that the indicators of threat recognition (belligerent 
status) are rarely as concrete and overt as in the traditional IAC 
context.  The evolving nature of NIAC, which today includes 
armed hostilities between states and transnational non-state 
groups, further exacerbates this complexity.64  It is critical, 
however, to distinguish between targeting authority triggered by 
status and targeting authority triggered by conduct, even when 
conduct is the key “threat recognition” factor resulting in status.  
Thus, while conduct is the key analytical indicator of status, this 
does not equate to conduct-based targeting authority—the type of 
authority utilized to respond to a genuine DPH situation.65 
This conduct based status determination is the true significance 
of the CCF concept endorsed in the DPH Study when applied in 
the NIAC context.66  In essence, in NIAC, CCF is a methodology to 
assess belligerent status and thereby trigger status-based targeting 
authority.67  As a method of assessing status, CCF is therefore 
merely a threat recognition equation that leads to a status 
 
anticipating or responding to threats and determining the amount 
of force needed under the circumstances). 
64 See, e.g., Obama Declares America ‘At War’ with Al Qaeda, Offers New Security 
Initiatives, CNSNEWS (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/59446 
(reporting that President Obama declared that America is “at war against al 
Qaeda”). 
65 A genuine DPH situation refers to a situation in which a civilian is engaged 
in “acts, which by their nature and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to 
the personnel and equipment of the armed forces.  Thus . . . becom[ing] a 
legitimate target, [but] only for as long as he takes part in hostilities.”  
COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618. 
66 The report remarks: 
Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for individual 
membership in an organized armed group is whether a person 
assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or 
her direct participation in hostilities (hereafter: “continuous 
combat function”).  Continuous combat function does not 
imply de jure entitlement to combatant privilege. Rather, it 
distinguishes members of the organized fighting forces of a 
non-state party from civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized 
basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative or 
other non-combat functions. 
Melzer, supra note 2, at 33–34 (footnotes omitted). 
67 See id. at 36 (providing the standard used for determining the targetability 
of belligerents in a NIAC: “In non-international armed conflict, organized armed 
groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist 
only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in 
hostilities (“continuous combat function”)). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
01 CORN JENKS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  10:57 PM 
338 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
determination triggering accordant targeting authority.  It is not a 
method for determining when a civilian’s conduct justifies a hostile 
response because of DPH (conduct based targeting authority).68  
CCF is therefore merely the threat recognition criterion that is used 
to confirm belligerent status, a conclusion reflected in the DPH 
Study: 
Continuous combat function requires lasting integration 
into an organized armed group acting as the armed forces of a 
non-State party to an armed conflict.  Thus, individuals whose 
continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or 
command of acts or operations amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities are assuming a continuous 
combat function.  An individual recruited, trained and 
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly 
participate in hostilities on its behalf can be considered to 
assume a continuous combat function even before he or she 
first carries out a hostile act.  This case must be 
distinguished from persons comparable to reservists who, 
after a period of basic training or active membership, leave 
the armed group and re-integrate into civilian life. Such 
“reservists” are civilians until and for such time as they are 
called back to active duty.69 
This test provides a logical and workable method to trigger status 
based targeting authority in NIAC.  While it is obviously less clear-
cut than reliance on uniforms to distinguish combatants from 
civilians, it accounts for two realities.  First, as the DPH Study 
emphasizes, members of organized belligerent groups in NIAC 
(individuals who are presumed hostile to friendly forces and 
therefore subject to a presumption of targetability) are a distinct 
category from civilians.70  Second, the lack of any real incentive for 
members of these groups to wear distinctive uniforms or insignia 
necessitates reliance on their patterns of conduct as the principal 
 
68 See id. at 45 (explaining that DPH “refers to specific hostile acts carried out 
by individuals” but not mentioning CCF). 
69 Id. at 34 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
70 See id. (“Individuals who continuously accompany or support an 
organized armed group, but whose function does not involve direct participation 
in hostilities, are not members of that group within the meaning of IHL.  Instead, 
they remain civilians assuming support functions, similar to private contractors 
and civilian employees accompanying State armed forces.”). 
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threat recognition criterion used to assess when they are part of an 
“enemy” party to the conflict.71 
The CCF test has, however, contributed to the flawed inference 
that non-state operatives cannot be characterized as belligerents, 
but must instead be treated as civilians.72  The CCF focus on 
individual conduct is interpreted by some as simply indicating a 
special class of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.  This 
leads to the erroneous conclusion that CCF derived targeting 
authority is analogous to what military operators know as 
 
71 See id. at 35. 
In practice, the principle of distinction must be applied based on 
information which is practically available and can reasonably be 
regarded as reliable in the prevailing circumstances.  A continuous 
combat function may be openly expressed through the carrying of 
uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons.  Yet it may also be 
identified on the basis of conclusive behavior, for example where a 
person has repeatedly directly participated in hostilities in support of an 
organized armed group in circumstances indicating that such conduct 
constitutes a continuous function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or 
temporary role assumed for the duration of a particular operation. 
Id. 
72 See generally Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to 
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741 (2010) (finding 
civilians lose protection under the Guidance when engaging in acts of preparation 
for direct participation); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637 
(2010) (critiquing the four critical perspectives on the interpretation of DPH); Nils 
Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831 (2010) (arguing that the ICRC’s 
position on the definition of membership in an organized armed force can be 
accurately understood when Guidance sections are conjunctively read);  W. Hays 
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No 
Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010) (providing a 
critical historical analysis of the Guidance regarding the protection of civilians 
during war); Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: 
The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2010) (explaining that 
civilians who “directly participate” in hostilities are not protected from attack); 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5 (2010) (noting that the 
Guidance formula for international armed conflict defines civilians negatively); 
Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641 
(2010) (arguing that “organized armed groups” are classified with unique criteria 
and are not considered civilian).  
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conduct-based rules of engagement.73  While this error will be 
addressed in more detail below, in summary it conflates the focus 
on conduct to assess membership (thereby triggering status based 
targeting authority) with the focus on individual conduct to 
determine when a civilian loses presumptive protection from 
attack.  
It is true that the ultimate outcome of both of these equations is 
a justified use of force.  However, the impact of competing 
presumptions associated with status versus conduct based 
targeting authority indicates there are important, albeit subtle, 
second and third order consequences resulting from this erroneous 
interpretation.  The conclusion that use of force is permitted 
against both a civilian directly participating in hostilities and a 
member of an armed belligerent group therefore does not justify 
interpreting CCF in NIAC as a test to determine when a civilian is 
directly participating in hostilities as opposed to when the civilian 
becomes a member of a belligerent group.  It is the thesis of this 
Article that CCF in NIAC establishes belligerent group status and 
not simply a temporary loss of civilian protection from attack.  This 
is because integration into the belligerent forces of a non-state 
group is functionally synonymous with integration into a 
combatant force in IAC.  Indeed, the DPH Study seems to 
emphasize this consequence of CCF in NIAC: 
[I]t distinguishes members of the organized fighting forces 
of a non-State party from civilians who directly participate 
in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or 
unorganized basis, or who assume exclusively political, 
administrative or other non-combat functions.74 
It is obviously significant that the term “distinguishes” is used in 
this passage, for it confirms that individuals who engage in a CCF 
in NIAC must be distinguished from civilians, even those civilians 
who take a direct part in hostilities. 
 
73 Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jenson, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal 
for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 787, 815–18 (2008) (noting instances where the United States has employed 
conduct-based rules of engagement as justifications for carrying out targeted 
attacks).  
74 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 33–34.  
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3. WHY THE USE OF CONDUCT TO ESTABLISH STATUS  
UNDERMINES THE EXTENSION OF THE DPH RULE  
TO DEFINE ENEMY BELLIGERENT FORCES 
It is clear that both organizational status and DPH—whether 
assessed on a case-by-case basis or pursuant to the CCF test—
result in lawful targetability.75  This raises an obvious question 
related to targeting individuals hostile to a friendly force:  Why 
does it matter whether forces apply status or conduct-based 
targeting authority?  This question has certainly become more 
difficult to answer in the wake of the CCF test, which mitigates the 
consequence between status and conduct based targeting 
authority.  However, treating CCF as a form of civilian conduct 
triggering targeting authority dilutes the authority to address 
threats to friend forces emanating from organized belligerent 
groups.  Such dilution should be unacceptable—to both 
belligerents and, perhaps surprisingly, civilians. 
All battlefield targeting authority falls into two broad 
categories:  status and conduct based.  Status based targeting 
authority is, as described above, triggered by the determination 
that a proposed object of attack is a member of an opposition 
belligerent force.76  In contrast, conduct based targeting is based on 
the determination that an individual presumed inoffensive is 
engaged in conduct hostile to the friendly force.77  Accordingly, 
status based targeting has always typified the traditional 
conception of armed hostilities between armed forces, whereas 
 
75 See Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(3) (allowing for the targeting of 
civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”); see also Melzer, 
supra note 2, at 36 (suggesting allowance of targeting of such individuals who 
serve a “continuous combat function”). 
76 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(1)–(2): 
1.  The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that 
Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented 
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party.  
Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system 
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict. 
2.  Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than 
medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third 
Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to 
participate directly in hostilities. 
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conduct based targeting reflects more of a constabulary function 
performed by the armed forces in the context of armed hostilities. 
This dichotomy is reflected in the traditional DPH equation.  
Prior to the advent of the CCF test, DPH was an extremely 
restrictive concept.  Only when a civilian engaged in conduct that 
would result in actual and immediate harm to an armed force did 
he lose legal protection from being made the deliberate object of 
attack.78  This test was and remains premised on a critical 
presumption:  civilians are inoffensive and deviation from that 
condition is an exceptional situation.79  Accordingly, because the 
evidence supporting attack must be sufficient to prove a gross 
deviation from the presumed standard of behavior, the burden of 
risk is placed squarely on the responding armed force.80 
The allocation of risk resulting from status-based targeting 
decisions is fundamentally different.  The determination of hostile 
status triggers the opposite presumption from that afforded to 
civilians:  that members of the opposition group represent an 
actual and ongoing threat of hostility to friendly forces.  A status 
determination triggers the authority, derived from the principle of 
military necessity, to take “those measures not forbidden by 
international law which are indispensable for securing the 
complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”81  It is 
critical to recognize that this authority is not confined to the 
individual.  Reference to “the enemy” indicates (in accordance 
with the customary nature of armed hostilities) that it is the 
 
77 See Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(3) (allowing for the targeting of 
civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”). 
78 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618–19.  
The immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to an overriding 
condition, namely, on their abstaining from all hostile acts. Hostile acts 
should be understood to be acts which by their nature and purpose are 
intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the 
armed forces. Thus a civilian who takes part in armed combat, either 
individually or as part of a group, thereby becomes a legitimate target, 
though only for as long as he takes part in hostilities. 
Id. 
79 See id. at 618–19 (distinguishing between civilians directly participating in 
hostilities and those who are merely participating in the war effort). 
80 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgment on Appeal, 
paras. 79–86 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 19, 2010) (noting 
that the burden of proof is not shifted from the armed force making the attack just 
because there is insufficient evidence in regards to the appearance of the victim).  
81 See DEPT. OF THE ARMY, supra note 42, ¶ 3(a) (emphasis added). 
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opposition organization, and not just individual operatives of the 
organization, that is the legitimate objective of submission.82  
Accordingly, the law authorizes resort to deadly force immediately 
upon the belligerent status determination.  Perhaps more 
importantly, because members of opposition belligerent groups 
qualify as lawful military objectives as a result of their status, the 
status determination triggers the legal authority to employ force 
against them as a measure of first resort, with no requirement to 
exhaust less than lethal means of subduing the threat.  This reflects 
an axiom of targeting law:  the burden of risk associated with 
armed hostilities is placed squarely on members of armed 
belligerent groups for as long as their status remains extant.  They 
remain subject to attack unless and until they take affirmative 
action to rebut the presumption of threat, specifically by surrender 
or by being made combat ineffective as the result of wounds or 
some other disability.83 
The CCF test certainly represents an important step forward in 
reconciling the concept of direct participation with the reality of 
contemporary armed conflicts.  However, it confuses these 
competing but complementary presumptions because it straddles a 
line between status and conduct based targeting authority, 
blurring the resulting operative targeting presumptions.84  While 
CCF indicates the individual is a member of an enemy belligerent 
group, the test is clearly conduct oriented, and the consequence of 
satisfying the test embedded within the DPH rule.85  As a result, a 
 
82 The qualifier “not forbiddened by international law” indicates that the 
authority to inflict harm terminates once an opponent is rendered hors de combat 
(out of combat by reason of wounds, sickness, or capture).  See id.; Protocol I, supra 
note 1, art. 41.  
83 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 41(2)(a)-(c) (describing the three types of 
persons hors de combat as being those who are captured by adverse party, show an 
intention to surrender, or have been incapacitated from wounds or illness). 
84 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 27–36 (commenting on the “mutual 
exclusiveness of the concepts of civilian, armed forces, and organized armed 
groups”). 
85 See id. at 36.  
For the purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international 
armed conflict, all persons who are not members of state armed forces or 
organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and, 
therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities in non-international armed 
conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-
state party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose 
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CCF determination results in the loss of presumptive protection 
from attack, just as actually firing a weapon at a military force 
would result in the loss of protection for a civilian acting 
individually.86  However, because it is associated with a rule 
resulting in the loss of civilian protection, it risks becoming the 
exclusive test for assessing the targetability of individuals not 
incorporated into an armed force subordinate to state authority 
and control—namely non-state belligerent groups in NIAC.  This is 
highly problematic because it effectively renders all non-state 
actors civilians, who in turn, benefit from presumptive protection 
from attack. 
It is notable that the ICRC recognized in the DPH Study that 
such an interpretation is unjustified, and that it diminishes the 
protection of the civilian population at large.87  This recognition is 
absolutely appropriate.  As the ICRC notes, the principle of 
distinction depends on the recognition of opposing belligerent 
groups, for such recognition facilitates targeting categorizations 
during armed conflict.88  In effect, this is a concession that the legal 
authority for targeting such groups is based on a fundamentally 
different presumption than that applicable to civilians directly 
participating in hostilities—even those falling within the CCF test.  
Nonetheless, the DPH Study itself reflects an ongoing uncertainty 
as to the exact effect of the CCF concept, which contributes to the 
broader uncertainty as to the presence of non-state belligerent 
groups.  The most profound example of this is Section IX of the 
Study.89 
 
continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous 
combat function”). 
Id. 
86 Firing a weapon at a military force would be an act “which by [its] nature 
and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of 
the armed forces” and therefore would result in loss of protection for the civilian.  
See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618. 
87 See Melzer, supra note 2, 27–28 (remarking that unclear boundaries between 
civilians and non-State armed forces will result in potential harms for the civilian 
population). 
88 See id. at 28 (“[T]his approach would seriously undermine the conceptual 
integrity of the categories of persons underlying the principle of distinction, most 
notably because it would create parties to non-international armed conflicts 
whose entire armed forces remain part of the civilian population.”). 
89 See id. at 77–82 (suggesting an imperative necessity to maintain restraint 
and proportionality even when dealing with an organized, albeit non-State, 
armed force). 
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4. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE SCHIZOPHRENIA 
4.1. CCF and the Minimum Force Requirement 
Perhaps the most significant practical distinction between 
status and conduct based targeting authority is the effect of the 
principle of proportionality.90  Because a determination that an 
individual is a member of an enemy belligerent group triggers 
status based targeting, the LOAC has always permitted the 
attacking force to employ deadly force as a measure of first resort.  
In other words, status indicates the individual is a lawful military 
objective: a person, place, or thing subject to lawful attack.91  This 
authority is in no way qualified by the rule of proportionality.  
Instead, the only limitation on the selection of methods and/or 
means of warfare to attack a military objective (beyond the initial 
targetability determination) is the prohibition against the 
calculated infliction of unnecessary suffering.92 
It could be argued that the unnecessary suffering prohibition 
implicitly imposes a proportionality obligation.  This is, however, 
incorrect.  The foundation of the rule prohibiting unnecessary 
suffering is the bar against the employment of weapons (means) or 
tactics (methods) against a lawful object of attack calculated to cause 
superfluous injury or suffering.93  What is superfluous?  This has 
unquestionably been a vexing LOAC question.  However, the 
nature of military doctrine, training, tactics, and operations all 
 
90 Proportionality requires that armed forces refrain from any “attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”  Protocol I, supra note 
1, art. 57(2)(a)(iii). 
91 See id. art. 52(2).   
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects 
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage. 
Id. 
92 See id. art. 35(2) (“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering.”). 
93 See id. art. 35(1) (giving Parties the right to “choose methods and means of 
warfare”) (emphasis added). 
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indicate that causing death, as a measure of first resort is not 
considered legally superfluous.94  
In fact, deliberately inflicting injuries that cannot be treated—
for example permanent loss of sight or hearing—is far more likely 
to be considered to run afoul of this rule than killing the same 
enemy belligerent.95  This might seem oxymoronic, but it is a 
reflection of the customary understanding that employing methods 
and means of warfare with the objective of causing death as a 
measure of first resort is consistent with the fundamental authority 
derived from the principle of military necessity to take all 
measures necessary to bring about the prompt submission of an 
enemy organization. 
This conclusion is reinforced by one of the most important 
rules in AP I: Article 51(5).96  Commonly called the proportionality 
rule, Article 51(5) prohibits attacks on lawful military objectives 
when the commander anticipates that the attack will produce 
excessive collateral damage or incidental injury.97  It is clear that 
the beneficiaries of this rule are not the objects of attack (military 
objectives), but instead victims of collateral effects, namely 
civilians.98  The benefit afforded to the objects of attack is purely 
gratuitous—an otherwise lawful attack against military objectives 
is prohibited not because of the disproportionate effect it will have 
 
94 See SOLIS, supra note 2, at 270. 
“Warfare . . . justifies subjecting an enemy to massive and decisive force, 
and the suffering that it brings.  Military necessity only justifies the 
infliction of suffering upon an enemy combatant . . . .  [H]owever . . .  
military necessity only justifies the infliction of as much suffering as is 
necessary to bring about the submission of an enemy.”  Military 
necessity is the balance between destruction of the enemy and humanity. 
Id. (quoting Geoffrey Corn, International & Operational Law Note: Principal 4: 
Preventing Unnecessary Suffering, THE ARMY LAWYER 1, 50-51 (1998)).  
95 See Disarmament: The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UNOG, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256ee600585943/(httppages)/4f0def093b4860b4c1257180
004b1b30?opendocument (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (outlining the prohibition on 
certain types of weapons which cause unnecessary suffering). 
96 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(5). 
97 Id. art. 51(5)(b) (“An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”) (emphasis added). 
98 Article 51 of API is entitled “Protection of the Civilian Population.”  Id. art. 
51 (stating that civilians must be accorded protection against dangers arising from 
military operations). 
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on them, but because of the desire to protect civilians and or 
civilian property in their vicinity.99 
No analogous proportionality protection is afforded to lawful 
objects of attack, including enemy belligerent forces.100  
Accordingly, it is legally impossible to employ excessive force 
against the deliberate and lawful object of violence in armed 
conflict; those objects may be attacked with whatever amount of 
force is considered necessary to bring about their immediate 
submission.101  Perhaps more importantly, it is common practice to 
use overwhelming force against such enemy objectives in order to 
influence the subsequent behavior of enemy leadership and other 
enemy forces.102  Of course, once the enemy belligerent is rendered 
hors de combat by wounds, sickness, or capture, he no longer 
qualifies as a lawful object of attack.103  But the protection afforded 
to such an individual is in no way derived from a proportionality 
requirement; it is simply the result of the fact that the individual is 
no longer capable of engaging in belligerent conduct as an agent of 
the enemy belligerent leadership.104 
If CCF is merely a threat recognition methodology resulting in 
a belligerent status determination, then individuals engaging in 
CCF should be subject to attack without any proportionality-based 
constraint.  The DPH Study, however, suggests a contrary 
conclusion.  In Section IX, the DPH Study indicates that the use of 
force directed against individuals falling within the CCF definition 
 
99 Id. art. 51(1) (stating that Article 51 was written to increase the protection of 
civilians under LOAC). 
100 See generally Protocol I, supra note 1. 
101 See, e.g., id. arts. 48, 51, 57 (providing restrictions on otherwise lawful 
attacks for the protection of the civilian population but providing no protection or 
formula for restraint for purely military objectives). 
102 See, e.g., Sue Chan, Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage, CBS NEWS (Jan. 
24, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews 
/main537928.shtml (describing the war plan prior to the invasion of Iraq that 
would have called for an attack of 800 cruise missiles over two days against 
Baghdad in order to bring about the “psychological destruction of the enemy’s 
will to fight”). 
103 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 41 (“A person…hors de combat shall not be 
made the object of attack.”). 
104  COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 482 (“It is 
a fundamental principle of the law of war that those who do not participate in the 
hostilities shall not be attacked. In this respect harmless civilians and soldiers hors 
de combat are a priori on the same footing.”). 
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is subject to such a constraint.105  However, even the purported 
source of this constraint reveals the invalidity of this proposition. 
As noted above, jus in bello proportionality does not protect 
enemy belligerent operatives who qualify as objects of deliberate 
attack.106  As a result, Section IX is unsupported by any positive or 
customary LOAC obligation.  This is essentially conceded in the 
Study when it cites the general principle of humanity as the source 
of the constraint.  According to Section IX: 
In the absence of express regulation, the kind and degree of 
force permissible in attacks against legitimate military 
targets should be determined, first of all, based on the 
fundamental principles of military necessity and humanity . 
. . . 
While it is impossible to determine, ex ante, the precise 
amount of force to be used in each situation, considerations 
of humanity require that, within the parameters set by the 
specific provisions of IHL, no more death, injury, or 
destruction be caused than is actually necessary for the 
accomplishment of a legitimate military purpose in the 
prevailing circumstances . . . . 
In sum, while operating forces can hardly be required to 
take additional risks for themselves or the civilian 
population in order to capture an armed adversary alive, it 
would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary 
or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to 
surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use 
of lethal force.  In such situations, the principles of military 
necessity and of humanity play an important role in 
determining the kind and degree of permissible force 
against legitimate military targets.107 
This application of the principle of humanity may seem appealing, 
but it is fundamentally inconsistent with the scope of authority 
established by the principle of military objective.  This principle, as 
 
105 Melzer, supra note 2, at 77 (“Loss of protection from direct attack, whether 
due to direct participation in hostilities (civilians) or continuous combat function 
(members of organized armed groups), does not mean that the persons concerned 
fall outside the law.”). 
106 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(5)(b) (providing protection for civilians and 
not other parties). 
107 Melzer, supra note 2, at 80–82. 
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explained above, allows for or restricts deliberate attack authority 
based on presumptions, presumptions that are inherently over-
broad and under-inclusive.108  Nonetheless, these presumptions 
provide for a certain degree of clarity and consistency in an 
otherwise chaotic environment. 
It is clear that Section IX was motivated by the reality that 
application of the CCF concept would expand the scope of lawful 
targeting based on a determination of DPH.  This likely produced 
discomfort:  deliberate attack authority applicable to individuals 
who perform a CCF but who, at the moment when force is applied 
against them, may not be identifiable as belligerents based on 
conduct which creates an imminent risk to friendly forces.  It also 
seems clear that the ICRC understood the minimal authority for 
applying a proportionality qualifier to belligerents.  In justifying 
this purported limitation, the DPH Study begins by conceding that 
it will rarely apply to a lawful combatant in the IAC context: 
In classic large-scale confrontations between well-equipped 
and organized armed forces or groups, the principles of 
military necessity and of humanity are unlikely to restrict 
the use of force against legitimate military targets beyond 
what is already required by specific provisions of IHL.109 
The discussion then shifts the focus to the civilian engaged in DPH, 
revealing its palpable discomfort with subjecting such a civilian to 
targeting authority analogous in scope to that applicable to the 
traditional combatant: 
The practical importance of their restraining function will 
increase with the ability of a party to the conflict to control 
the circumstances and area in which its military operations 
are conducted, and may become decisive where armed 
forces operate against selected individuals in situations 
comparable to peacetime policing.  In practice, such 
considerations are likely to become particularly relevant 
where a party to the conflict exercises effective territorial 
control, most notably in occupied territories and non-
international armed conflicts. 
 
108 Id. at 80 (conceding that “it is impossible to determine . . . the precise 
amount of force to be used”). 
109 Id. 
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For example, an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant 
using a radio or mobile phone to transmit tactical targeting 
intelligence to an attacking air force would probably have 
to be regarded as directly participating in hostilities.  
Should the restaurant in question be situated within an area 
firmly controlled by the opposing party, however, it may be 
possible to neutralize the military threat posed by that 
civilian through capture or other non-lethal means without 
additional risk to the operating forces or the surrounding 
civilian population.110 
As will be explained below, restricting this asserted targeting 
authority qualification to this type of civilian engaging in DPH 
(ostensibly in the IAC context) is arguably defensible.  However, in 
a classic manifestation of the proverbial ‘slippery slope’, the DPH 
Study then extends the qualification to the NIAC non-state 
belligerent: 
Similarly, under IHL, an insurgent military commander of 
an organized armed group would not regain civilian 
protection against direct attack simply because he 
temporarily discarded his weapons, uniform and 
distinctive signs in order to visit relatives inside 
government-controlled territory.  Nevertheless, depending 
on the circumstances, the armed or police forces of the 
government may be able to capture that commander 
without resorting to lethal force.111 
This one paragraph reveals the inherent schizophrenia of 
Section IX.  It is simply incompatible with the DPH Study’s implicit 
(if not explicit) recognition that CCF in the NIAC context results 
not in limited targetability, but instead on belligerent status.  In 
essence, Section IX is an attempt to “re-civilianize” the NIAC non-
state belligerent by cloaking that operative with a proportionality 
protection.112  However, imposing a minimum necessary force 
obligation on government forces engaged in armed conflict against 
non-state belligerents is inconsistent with the concession that CCF 
 
110 Id. at 80–81 (emphasis added). 
111 Id. at 81. 
112 See id. (noting that civilians must be taken into account in the 
proportionality assessment of a military operation that is likely to cause incidental 
harm to civilians). 
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produces belligerent status, and with the overall concept of status 
based targeting presumptions. 
This proposed application of a unitary minimum necessary 
force qualifier to both civilians engaging in DPH in the IAC context 
(to include in an occupied area) and non-state belligerents is 
problematic on a broader level.  By applying a force limitation rule 
ostensibly justified vis-à-vis civilians (even those taking a direct 
part in hostilities) to non-state belligerents, Section IX confuses the 
effect of CCF in the NIAC context.  This confusion has, in the 
opinion of the authors, contributed to the more widespread 
misconception that non-state belligerents are merely civilians 
engaged in DPH who remain civilians while they are so engaged 
(albeit subject to use of force).  However, the mixing of armed 
conflict and law enforcement response authority reflected in the 
above extract from Section IX exposes the danger of this premise.113  
In short, continuing to characterize these belligerent operatives as 
civilian leads to an inevitable but impermissible outcome:  the 
dilution of state targeting authority and a corresponding lessening 
of the protection of the civilian population writ large. 
This outcome is not only unjustified and inconsistent with 
status based targeting principles, it is arguably perverse, for it vests 
an unprivileged belligerent with greater protection than the 
privileged counterpart.  As noted above, the DPH Study at least 
implicitly concedes CCF in NIAC results in belligerent status—a 
method of identifying members of organized armed groups (a 
party to an armed conflict).114  However, applying the Section IX 
minimum force qualification to these belligerent operatives would 
grant them protection from being made the object of attack with 
the use of deadly force as a first resort.115  No analogous protection 
applies to lawful combatants, who by virtue of that status are 
subject to such risk so long as they capable of acting as agents of 
enemy leadership.116 
 
113 See id. at 80–82 (implying that proportionality might require that 
identifiable members of belligerent armed groups be non-lethally arrested, 
whether by the State’s armed or police forces). 
114 See id. at 81 (proffering example of civilians directly participating in 
hostilities). 
115 See id. at 79 (forbidding causing injury or destruction when not necessary 
in order to accomplish a legitimate military objective). 
116  COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 482 (“It is 
a fundamental principle of the law of war that those who do not participate in the 
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Why the ICRC would propose such a minimum force 
qualification is understandable.  By conceding CCF results in 
belligerent status for NIAC non-state operatives, the DPH Study 
conceded a broad scope of targeting authority for government 
forces.  However, the CCF concept itself reflects the reality that 
threat identification in this context is far more complex than in 
traditional IAC—because clear objective criteria of belligerent 
status are rarely available.117  Accordingly, the risk of error in the 
status decision is obviously increased vis-à-vis a non-state 
operative.  Imposing a minimum force qualification on targeting 
authority would obviously mitigate that risk by requiring the 
attacking commander to forego the use of deadly force wherever 
and whenever feasible. 
 
This anomaly was apparently not lost on the ICRC.  Instead of 
accounting for it by drawing a bright line between belligerent 
targeting authority and the authority to use force in response to a 
civilian taking a direct part in hostilities, Section IX used it as an 
opportunity to open another front:  extending the minimum 
necessary force obligation to all enemy belligerents.118  The DPH 
Study cites Jean Pictet in support of this extension.  However, in 
the same footnote, the DPH Study concedes that: 
During the expert meetings, it was generally recognized 
that the approach proposed by Pictet is unlikely to be 
operable in classic battlefield situations involving large-
scale confrontations (Report DPH 2006, pp. 75f., 78) and 
that armed forces operating in situations of armed conflict, 
even if equipped with sophisticated weaponry and means 
of observation, may not always have the means or 
 
hostilities shall not be attacked.  In this respect harmless civilians and soldiers hors 
de combat are a priori on the same footing.”). 
117 In a traditional IAC combatants are required to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population, but in a modern NIAC non-state forces have no 
desire or incentive to do so.  See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3), (obliging 
combatants to distinguish themselves in combat in order to protect civilian 
populations); see also, Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come 
to Offer Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253 
(2011) (arguing for the extension of lawful combatant status as a means of 
ensuring compliance with humanitarian law). 
118 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 82 (“[I]t would defy basic notions of humanity 
to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to 
surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.”). 
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opportunity to capture rather than kill (Report DPH 2006, 
p. 63).119 
Indeed, opposition to this interpretation as fatally flawed is 
reflected in subsequent scholarly critiques by members of the DPH 
working group, which notes that it is inconsistent with the 
widespread and customary understanding of status based 
targeting authority.120 
Why would the ICRC muddy the proverbial waters with this 
overreaching?  The most obvious reason, as noted above, is that it 
was considered necessary to offset the inherent expansion in risk to 
presumptive civilians produced by the CCF concept.  However, by 
asserting the constraint applied to NIAC belligerents, the 
proponents of Section IX produced an anomaly that could only be 
eliminated by asserting that the minimum necessary force 
requirement applies to all enemy belligerents, even traditional 
combatants.  In this regard, it must be emphasized, the DPH 
Study’s concession that application of this constraint will often be 
impracticable in traditional force on force combat, in no way 
suggests that the obligation is inapplicable in that context.  Instead, 
Section IX injects another feasible precaution obligation into the 
use of combat power in any armed conflict.  Unfortunately, unlike 
all other such obligations, which are intended to mitigate the 
collateral impact on civilians as the result of attacking a lawful 
objective, the beneficiary of this asserted obligation is the lawful 
and deliberate object of attack itself. 
4.2. Conflating of law and policy 
There may be—and indeed often are—policy and operational 
rationale for imposing a minimum force requirement on 
government forces combating non-state belligerent groups.  
Indeed, the history of armed conflict is replete with examples of 
commanders imposing restraints on their forces in order to achieve 
some tactical, operational, or strategic objective.121  But couching 
 
119 Id. at 82 n.221. 
120 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing flawed inferences 
related to who can be treated as a civilian for DPH purposes).  
 
121 See Andrew Curry, Don’t Shoot Until You See the Whites of Their Eyes!, 
MILITARY CHANNEL, http://military.discovery.com/history/revolutionary-
war/bunker-hill/bunker-hill-2.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (noting that the 
colonial armies forced delay in opening fire in order to maximize British casualties 
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the requirement as a legal constraint at best conflates lex lata and de 
lege ferenda.122  At worse, the conflation, while cloaked in terms of 
humanity, will add uncertainty in the already complex NIAC 
environment and, ultimately, result in increased civilian casualties.  
The conflation also confuses the differing considerations through 
which the use of force is limited:  legal, policy, and operational. 
While the term “rules of engagement” (ROE) is commonly 
misunderstood to mean the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), the 
ROE are a subset of the LOAC.  The LOAC forms the outer, and 
legal, bounds of permissible conduct in hostilities.  Those 
parameters are further reduced, not legally, but through a host of 
policy considerations, including political and diplomatic.123  
Military commanders also impose restraints and limitations on 
their forces.124  The results of limiting conduct due to policy and 
operational considerations are the ROE.  But to contend that 
because the ROE are a subset of the LOAC and that the ROE 
contain limitations on the use of force means the limitations derive 
from the LOAC is a sophism. 
The practice of policy and operationally based limitations on 
what the LOAC would otherwise permit is not limited to 
operations against unconventional threats in a NIAC.  Yet, 
 
during the early stages of the American Revolution); see also HEADQUARTERS DEP’T 
OF THE ARMY, FM3–24 COUNTERINSURGENCY ch.1, at 5–12 (2006) (discussing the 
moral and strategic need for restraint in counterinsurgency operations, such as the 
need to avoid turning the populace against the counterinsurgency effort due to 
collateral or intentional injuries to innocents). 
122 In other words, conflating what the law is with what the law should be.  
See “Beck’s Law Dictionary”: A Compendium of International Law Terms and Phrases, 
http://people.virginia.edu/~rjb3v/latin.html#lex lata (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).  
123 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 3121.01A, 
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES (Jan. 15, 2000) (establishing 
guidelines for the use of force by U.S. forces operating in different environments).  
The standing rules of engagement, or “SROE,” provide an example of how rules 
of engagement reflect LOAC, but also operational and policy constraints. 
124 For example, successive commanders of NATO’s International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan have issued a “tactical directive” which limited 
where and under what circumstances coalition militaries may use force.  The 
version General Stan McChrystal issued is notable for its limitations on the use of 
airstrikes.  Memorandum from the Headquarters of the NATO Int’l Security 
Assistance Force (July 6, 2009), available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu 
/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf.  See also Curry, supra note 121 
(recalling how colonial armies would purposely delay opening fire in an effort to 
maximize British casualties during the American Revolution); HEADQUARTERS 
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 121, at 5–12 (discussing the need and reasons for 
restraint in counterinsurgency operations). 
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however broadly they may be applied in the spectrum of conflicts, 
these considerations do not justify transforming policy constraints 
into a general legal obligation.  The ability to deliberately attack 
enemy belligerents with the full force of combat power available 
for mission accomplishment—an authority that implicitly allows 
the use of deadly force as a measure of first resort—is an essential 
aspect of armed hostilities between organized belligerent groups.  
Indeed, the ability to mass the effects of combat power at the 
decisive place and time often contributes to accelerating enemy 
capitulation, thereby sparing many enemy belligerents who might 
otherwise be subject to a loss of life even if a minimum necessary 
force obligation were applied. 
Admittedly, the complexity borne of government forces 
operating in a NIAC—where the need to use deadly force as 
opposed to minimum force is unclear and will vary from person to 
person—cannot be eliminated.  But this dilemma is not newly 
discovered.  Indeed, as this Article has acknowledged, there are 
circumstances when a minimal force requirement may be 
appropriate, as in the case of the civilian who directly participates 
in hostilities.  Again, such targeting is based on conduct and not a 
presumption of offensiveness stemming from membership status 
in a belligerent armed group.  While there may be a legal and 
policy basis for requiring government forces to employ the 
minimum necessary force in certain circumstances in an NIAC, to 
extend a minimum force requirement to include members of 
belligerent armed groups is both logically and operationally 
inconsistent, dilutes the concept and protections of a civilian, and 
further encourages non-compliance with the LOAC. 
5. MAINTAINING DISTINCTION INTEGRITY IN THE  
APPLICATION OF THE CCF TEST 
There is a rational way to reconcile Section IX with status based 
targeting presumptions:  maintain the distinction integrity.  
Acknowledging that NIAC involves armed hostilities between 
competing belligerent groups is a critical first step in doing so, and 
the DPH Study makes an important contribution.125  However, this 
must be accompanied by an additional acknowledgment:  all 
 
125 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 27–28 (“[C]ivilians, armed forces, and 
organized armed groups of the parties to the conflict are mutually exclusive 
categories also in non-international armed conflict.”). 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
01 CORN JENKS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  10:57 PM 
356 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
belligerent operatives—those involved in IAC and NIAC—are 
subject to status based targeting authority.  This acknowledgment 
must then lead to the critical conclusion that Section IX cannot 
properly be applied to any belligerent, including those identified 
by their CCF in a NIAC. 
Recognizing a bright line between genuine civilians—even 
those who deviate from their presumptive inoffensiveness by 
taking a direct part in hostilities—and belligerents will effectively 
preserve the critical distinction between conduct and status based 
targeting.  Only belligerents will be subjected to status based 
targeting.  This is a necessary aspect of armed conflict, because 
broad targeting authority is premised on the conclusion that the 
object of attack is not acting as an individual agent, but instead 
executing the will of belligerent leadership.  It is obvious that this 
presumption is at times overbroad.  It is a necessary (and at times 
unfortunate) aspect of armed conflict that enemy belligerents may 
be killed when capture may have been a viable alternative, or even 
when they present no actual risk to the attacking force.  This is a 
consequence of status based targeting authority derived from the 
presumption of threat triggered by the status determination.  That 
authority terminates only when the enemy belligerent is effectively 
separated from this subordinate agent derived presumption 
through incapacity or surrender.126 
This status based targeting authority is triggered by the 
determination that an individual is a member of an opposition 
belligerent group.  It is generally assumed that this determination 
will be relatively uncomplicated in the IAC context due to the 
expectation that enemy belligerents will wear distinctive uniforms.  
However, even during IAC this is not always true.  One need only 
consider the Taliban armed forces whose appearance was generally 
indistinguishable from the civilian population, or unconventional 
forces in Iraq who discarded their uniforms in order to appear to 
be civilians, as examples of this reality.127  However, NIAC will 
almost always involve hostilities with at least one party to the 
 
126 COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 482 
(remarking that “no person hors de combat” may be deliberately attacked, which 
derives from the “principle of the law of war that those who do not participate in 
the hostilities [should] not be attacked”). 
127 See Life in Afghanistan: Taliban Soldiers, GUARDIANUNLIMITED, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/pictures/image/0,8543,-10304255641,00.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2011) (displaying an image of Taliban soldiers in civilian 
clothing). 
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conflict that is unlikely to don distinctive uniforms as an 
asymmetrical tactic to capitalize on opposition concerns over 
targeting civilians in error or because of the absence of any legal 
incentive to distinguish themselves from the population.  As a 
result, conduct will increasingly become the key threat/status 
identification criterion.  This much is acknowledged by the DPH 
Study’s discussion of CCF in the NIAC context.128 
Properly understood, CCF in NIAC is therefore neither 
synonymous with DPH, nor a means of determining when a 
civilian is engaged in DPH.  Instead, CCF is a method for 
determining belligerent status, with all the consequences that flow 
therefrom.  Whether CCF produces the same outcome in IAC is 
unclear from the Study.  CCF unquestionably results in a loss of 
protection from an attack.  However, because IAC involves 
hostilities between lawful combatants—who must satisfy legally 
defined qualification requirements to obtain that status129—CCF 
does not result in lawful belligerent status.130  Furthermore, 
because the concept of an unprivileged belligerent in the context of 
IAC is generally rejected (although not universally), individuals 
engaging in a CCF in IAC must, by default, remain in the category 
of civilian, albeit with a loss of protection from attack and lack of 
combatant immunity.131 
Applying a proportionality constraint to protect these 
individuals is therefore fundamentally different than applying it to 
their NIAC counterparts.  This is because in the IAC context, CCF 
is not a status determination equation, but instead a conduct based 
criterion leading to the loss of protection from attack.132  
Nonetheless, the individual who loses that protection, while 
 
128 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 33–36 (positing that membership to an armed 
group “must depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an 
individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as a whole”). 
129 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
supra note 14, art. 4 (defining the various categories of persons who can be 
deemed Prisoners of War).  
130 CCF does not require that an individual satisfy the four requirements in 
the 3rd Geneva Convention, but merely requires that they be involved in a 
belligerent group on more than just a “spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized 
basis.”  Melzer, supra note 2, at 35. 
131 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 39 (“Where such personnel directly participate 
in hostilities without the express or tacit authorization of the state party to the 
conflict, they remain civilians and lose their protection against direct attack for 
such time as their direct participation lasts.”). 
132 Id. 
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subject to attack, remains in the category of civilian.  Because of 
this, it is not illogical to assert that any response to such a threat 
must be qualified by a minimum necessary force limitation.  This is 
because, as civilians, these individuals are not subject to status 
based targeting, but continue to benefit from the use of force 
limitations inherent in conduct based targeting authority.133  First, 
use of force is justified only when the individual’s conduct is 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of inoffensiveness; the apparent 
purpose of the CCF test.134  Second, the sole purpose of a 
responsive use of force is to restore the civilian to a condition of 
inoffensiveness, and not to permanently disable the individual’s 
ability to execute the will of enemy belligerent leadership, or to 
influence the future conduct of the enemy belligerent leadership.135  
Accordingly, if measures short of deadly force can effectively 
achieve that limited purpose, resorting to deadly force as a 
measure of first resort would exceed the conduct based authority 
triggered by the DPH.136 
5.1. Organized Belligerents:  Agents of Leadership Will 
Armed conflict, by its very nature, is a contest between armed 
groups.  Accordingly, the efficacy of the law that regulates armed 
conflict is contingent on the recognition of this reality.  Treating 
non-state operatives as a conglomeration of civilians taking a direct 
part in hostilities might, in the abstract, seem like an appealing 
response to addressing legal authorities related to such conflicts, 
but it fails to account for the collective/corporate nature of armed 
conflict.  The defining distinguishing factor between a true civilian 
and a member of a belligerent group is subordination to the will of 
 
133 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.”); COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618 
(“The immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to . . . their abstaining 
from all hostile acts.”). 
134 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618 
(“Thus a civilian who takes part in armed combat . . . thereby becomes a 
legitimate target, though only for as long as he takes part in hostilities.”); Melzer, 
supra note 2, at 33 (defining the criterion for the “continuous combat function” 
test). 
135 This is evidenced through the limited scope of authority granted in Article 
51.  See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 615–28. 
136 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 82 (discussing how it is against “basic notions 
of humanity to kill an adversary . . . where there manifestly is no necessity for the 
use of lethal force”). 
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belligerent leadership.  Whether the result of voluntary choice, or 
obligatory service, belligerent operatives do not act as autonomous 
agents in armed conflict.  Instead, they execute the will of 
belligerent leadership. 
As noted above, the traditional LOAC targeting framework 
acknowledges this reality by permitting presumptive based uses of 
deadly force.  Once an individual is identified as a member of an 
enemy belligerent group, friendly forces are entitled to presume 
the individual represents a hostile threat.  However, perhaps even 
more importantly, friendly forces act in order to disable the ability 
of the enemy belligerent operative from executing the will of 
enemy leadership.  In so doing, not only is the belligerent threat 
eliminated, but the corporate capacity of the enemy is degraded. 
It has become too simple to assume that the direct participation 
in the hostilities equation proposed by the ICRC Study is an 
adequate substitute for this traditional targeting authority.  That 
equation, while certainly an important component in addressing 
the threat posed by true civilians who engage in a continuous 
combat function, does not provide as coextensive a targeting 
authority as the belligerent status based targeting equation.  First, 
it is based on a requirement to assess each targeting decision 
through the lens of an individualized actual threat.137  While the 
CCF concept may expand the range of conduct that qualifies as 
such a threat, it is nonetheless a conduct based targeting equation.  
This fails to account for the need for presumptive based targeting.  
Second, its almost unitary focus on individualized threat 
assessment fails to account for the legitimate use of attacking 
belligerent operatives in order to influence belligerent leadership, 
not merely to eliminate an individual threat.138 
Applying status based targeting authority to NIAC eliminates 
these flaws.  That targeting authority is derived from the 
determination that individuals qualify as members of opposition 
belligerent groups.  This determination is unquestionably complex.  
Furthermore, in the NIAC context it will often be based on an 
assessment of conduct, for the simple reason that more objective 
criteria—like uniforms or specialized military equipment—will be 
unavailable.  However, even when status threat recognition is 
based on similar, if not identical, factors as those at the core of the 
 
137 See id. at 43 (noting the necessity of pointing to “specific acts” when 
establishing “direct participation”). 
138 See id. (focusing solely on individual participation in hostilities).  
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CCF test, the sum of the analysis is not a determination of conduct 
based targeting authority.  In short, conduct may be the test for 
status, but conduct derived status does not trigger conduct based 
targeting authority. 
Why, if the equation used for CCF and status determinations is 
analogous, is this distinction even necessary?  This is a logical 
question, but one that reveals a disconnect between legal theory 
and operational reality.  Treating non-state belligerent operatives 
as civilians who lose protection from attack for such time, as they 
take a direct part in hostilities, even under the expanded CCF test, 
grants them an unjustified windfall.  This is because it inverts the 
traditional targeting presumptions associated with armed conflict.  
This approach places the burden of validating individualized 
actual threat on the opposing belligerent operative.  This burden 
allocation is justified when the friendly operative encounters a 
civilian with no subordinate relationship to enemy belligerent 
leadership.  However, it is unjustified when encountering enemy 
belligerent operatives.  As noted above, imposing validation of 
actual threat as the condition precedent to targeting members of 
enemy belligerent groups degrades combat initiative, produces 
dangerous hesitation, and ultimately provides greater protection 
for the non-state operative than for the lawful belligerent.  Indeed, 
this latter consequence seems especially oxymoronic.  Why should 
a fighter without the privilege of operating on behalf of a state 
benefit from greater protection than his legitimate counterpart? 
The only plausible answer to this question is that such an 
outcome is a necessary consequence of the inherent uncertainty as 
to who is a civilian and who is a non-state belligerent operative.  
Applying a unitary conduct based targeting equation to all non-
regular armed forces mitigates the risk of erroneous targeting 
resulting from this uncertainty.  Accordingly, any additional 
protection afforded by the non-state actor is an incidental outcome 
of a rule intended to maximize protection for true civilians.  The 
more rational response to this uncertainty—at least from an 
operational perspective—is to develop credible and effective status 
recognition criteria.  Ultimately, if conduct based status 
determinations are based on criteria relatively analogous to the 
CCF test, it should be equally effective in mitigating the risk of 
targeting errors.  However, once that status is established, it would 
trigger targeting authority traditionally relied upon to bring enemy 
armed forces into submission as efficiently as possible.  It will also 
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protect friendly forces from the risk associated with treating enemy 
operatives as presumptive civilians. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The concept of Continuous Combat Function in the ICRCs 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Study represents an important 
step in clarifying when civilians lose their protection from 
deliberate attack.  However, this test was not, and should not be 
considered the controlling methodology for determining when 
non-state belligerent operatives may be lawfully attacked.  Instead, 
that determination must be made based on a determination of 
belligerent status; a determination that triggers a broader targeting 
authority than CCF and properly allocates risk between competing 
belligerent forces. 
Unfortunately, it is increasingly common to assert that non-
state belligerents are merely civilians directly participating in 
hostilities.  CCF is then relied upon as a logical solution to target 
legality decisions when engaged in hostilities against non-state 
groups.  This is a dangerous trend.  CCF is linked to the direct 
participation in hostilities qualifier to LOAC civilian protection 
from deliberate attack.  Because of this, it—like the protection it 
qualifies—is not a method for determining enemy belligerent 
targetability.  Instead, it must be confined to assessing when a true 
civilian, an individual acting autonomously and not executing the 
will of belligerent leadership, loses protection from attack. 
If CCF is confined to this context, it is a logical step forward in 
the LOAC.  While not a perfect solution to the challenge of dealing 
with civilians who engage in conduct inconsistent with their LOAC 
derived protections, it at least acknowledges the reality that such 
conduct is not restricted to raising a rifle and pulling the trigger.  
Even the Section IX concept—that armed forces may use only 
minimum necessary force when encountering a civilian who has 
engaged in CCF and therefore must detain when feasible—is 
acceptable if limited to the autonomous civilian actor.  But if 
extended to define when members of non-state belligerent groups 
may be attacked, the rule loses credibility. 
Conflicts between organized non-state groups and State armed 
forces are unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future.  Indeed, what 
is far more likely is that the definition of non-international armed 
conflict, and the security challenges to the State that compel policy-
makers to invoke LOAC authority in response to non-state threats, 
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will continue to become more complex.  Ultimately, however, 
armed conflict must be conceived as a contest between organized 
groups.  Deviating from this conception undermines the entire 
authority/obligation framework of the law.  The direct 
participation in hostilities cannot be a substitute for the reality that 
armed conflict is a contest between organizations, not a contest 
between one organization and a conglomerate of like-minded 
autonomous actors.  Armed conflicts—even against the most 
evasive and loosely organized enemy—are therefore not a one 
sided combatant COIN.  
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